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chinery of the government should be put in motion, must be lodged
somewhere. It is an historical fact that the attorney-general has
always had control of public prosecutions in England,13 and in this
country, except where such control has been diminished by statute. 4
C. R. M.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY-DIVORCE
FOR FRAUDULENT CONTRACT.
The parties in the case first became acquainted sometime during
the spring of 1937; the plaintiff, a man, claiming the first meeting
was May 18; the defendant, a woman, claiming it was March 29. A
week after their first meeting they engaged in illicit sexual relations.
Pregnancy resulted, and the defendant later brought a bastardy charge
against the plaintiff. Rather than stand trial on the charge, he mar-
ried her in October. On the following January 4, a child was'born
to the defendant which according to the attending physician had been
conceived approximately March 3'. The plaintiff, believing he was
not the father of the child, sought a divorce on the grounds of
fraudulent contract, a statutory ground in Ohio,' claiming the de-
fendant had fraudulently secured the marriage by declaring him to
be responsible for her pregnancy. The common pleas court found
that the plaintiff was not the father of the child, and granted a
divorce. The defendant appealed. Held: Reversed. When a man,
who has had illicit relations with a woman, marries her, knowing
at the time she is pregnant, he is conclusively presumed to be the
father of the child, and a divorce cannot 'be obtained on the ground
of fraud. Kawecki v. Kawecki, 67 Ohio App. 34, 21 Ohio Op. 76
(Court of Appeals of Lucas County 1941).
In Ohio, every child born during lawful wedlock is presumed
to be legitimate. 2 Before the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's
representation respecting the paternity of the child was fraudulent,
he must overcome this presumption. However, in the principal case
13 HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND p. 37; 3 Excyc. BRIT. 63; 3 BL. COmm. 27.
"
4 Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F. (2d) 676 (App. D. C. 1938).
1 OHIO GEN. CODE, Sec. 11979.
Powell v. State, 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N. E. 660 (1911).
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the court relied on the doctrine of Miller v. Anderson 3 that when a
man marries an expectant mother with full knowledge of her con-
dition, he is conclusively presumed to be the father of the child. It
seems the court made an unfortunate choice of terms in calling it a
"conclusive presumption" rather than merely a strong presumption.
If the plaintiff could show by clear and convincing proof that access
to the defendant was impossible during the period of conception,4 or
that he was impotent, any presumption that he was the father would
be rebutted. Within the last decade the American courts have begun
to follow the view of the European courts that blood tests may rebut
tl.e presumption of paternity.' Statutes in Ohio, New York, and
Wisconsin authorize the use of blood tests in paternity cases,7 the
Ohio statute authorizing the use of the Landsteiner-Bernstein blood
grouping test as evidence of non-paternity, not only in a bastardy
proceeding, but also "whenever it is relevant in a civil or criminal
proceeding to determine the paternity or identity of any person." 8
The Ohio courts have utilized this statute in several recent decisions,"
so that if the plaintiff had had blood grouping tests taken here which
positively showed that he was not the father, it would similarly have
rebutted the presumption of legitimacy. Although the case of Miller
v. Anderson has not been specifically overruled, two recent decisions 10
seem to hold that the presumption is no longer "conclusive," but
only a strong presumption which is rebuttable.
Assuming the presumption of legitimacy is overcome, plaintiff
n,.ust still show fraud sufficient to vitiate the marriage as a fraudulent
contract. Considerable conflict exists as to what constitutes such
fraud. Most courts are convinced that the marriage contract should
043 Ohio St. 473, 3 N. E. 605 (1885).
4 Powell v. State, 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N. E. 660 (1911).
Seig v. State, I Ohio L. Abs. 814 (1923).
.; Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. Dist. and Co. Rep. 229 (1933); State v. Well-
inc, 6 Ohio Op. 371, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 448 (1936); Stat v. Wright, 69 Ohio App. 191,
17 N. E. (2d) 428 (1938). For an excellent discussion on blood grouping tests, see
(1936) 2 OHIo ST. L. J. 203.
N. Y. Civil Practice Act, sec. 306-a, N. Y. Laws 1935 c. 196; 1935 Wisc. LAws, C.
351; OHio Gnr, CoDn, Sec. 12122.1, 12122-2.
"OHto GEN. CoDn, Sec. 12122-2.
"State v. Wright, 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N. E. (2d) 428 (1938); State v. Welling, 6
Ohio Op. 371, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 448 (1936); see (1938) 6 OHIo ST. L. J. 200.
"' Craner v. State, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 261, 262 (1936), in which the court says that if
the marriage had tal:cn place before the child was born an ahnost irrebuttable presumption
v.euld aris.; State v. Oldaker, 2s Ohio L. Abs. 495, 496 (1938), in which the court said
that the presumption is not conclusive, but avoided overruling Miller v. Anderson, supra,
note 3, by holding the presumption inapplicable because the parties had separated before
the child was born.
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be permanent and not avoided for trivial causes. But a bride's con-
cealment of pregnancy by another man from a 'bridegroom having
had no prenuptial intercourse with her is, according to the vast
majority of American courts, sufficient fraud to vitiate the marriage
contract."' In such cases the court will decree a divorce or grant an
annullment according to the statutory provisions in the jurisdiction.
The only Ohio decision on this situation follows the majority. 2
Two reasons are often given to support this rule: 13  (a) A woman
who is incapable of bearing a child to her husband because of her
pregnancy by another man is unable to perform part of the contract
into which she enters, and any representation that leads to the belief
that she is in a marriageable condition is a false statement of a mate-
rial fact, and is sufficient fraud to declare the marriage void. (b)
Public policy favors annulment as it would be very harsh to force
a spurious offspring upon the innocent husband.14  The English rule
until recently refused any relief despite the hardship it might cause
the innocent husband.'"
On the other hand when the husband himself has had prenuptial
intercourse, and seeks a divorce because his wife has fraudulently
represented that she is pregnant by him when she is actually preg-
nant by another or because she entirely concealed her pregnancy by
another, the courts of the United States are in conflict as to whether
or not they should grant the husband any remedy.' 6 The only Ohio
case on this situation refused a divorce.' 7  The courts refusing relief
often support their decision with two reasons:" (a) "The plaintiff
can have no standing in a court of equity, or he is particeps crirninis
"tMorris v. Morris, Wright 630 (Ohio 1834); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605
(Mass. 1862); Hardesty v. Hardesty, 193 Cal. 330, 223 Pac. 951 (1924), in which it was
held that the fact that the woman herself was ignorant of her pregnancy would not
prevent it from being fraud; L. R. A. 1916E 650.
12 Morris v. Morris, Wright 630 (Ohio 1834).
3 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605 (Mass. 1862).
1
4 Ibid., at p. 610.
15 Moss. v. Moss, (1897) P. 263, 66 L. J. (Probate) N. S. 154. But see Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1937, 1 Euw. 8 and I GEo. 6, sec. 7 (d) which makes this holding obsolete.
"QFor divorce or annulment-Gard v. Gard, 204 Mich. 255, 169 N. V. 908 (1918);
Jackson v. Ruby, 120 Me. 391, 115 Atl. 90 (1921); Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37,
114 N. W. 527 (1908); contro: Safford v. Safford, 224 Mass. 392, 113 N. E. 181 (1916);
Long v. Long, 77 N. C. 287, 24 Am. Rep. 449 (1877); Creshore v. Creshore, 97 Mass.
330, 93 Am. Dec. 198 (1867); Arno v. Arno, 265 Mass. 282, 163 N. E. 861 (1928); Foss
v. Foss, 12 Allen 26 (Mass. 1866); Seilheimer v. Seilheimer, 40 N. J. Eq. 412, 2 Atl.
376 (1885).
17 Huber v. Huber, I Iddings Term Rep. (Dayton, Ohio 1899).
13 Vanneman, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud (1925) 9 Miax. L. Rnv. 407, p. 502.
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with the defendant." "" (b) "The plaintiff is precluded relief due to
his own credulousness or imprudence." 21
Similarly, where the woman represents herself as pregnant by a
man with whom she has had prenuptial intercourse, when in fact she
is not pregnant at all, the courts usually refuse any remedy,21 be-
cause, as the court said in Fairchild v. Fairchild,22 "they are equally
abominable and filthy in the eyes of the law." A clearer case would
be that in which the woman honestly believed she was pregnant, and
only after the marriage discovered she was not, for here there
would be not a question of fraudulent representation but only in-
nocent mistake. The court would probably refuse relief.
The principal case seems to be well decided because the plaintiff
has failed to overcome the presumption of legitimacy, and the fraud
was not sufficiently proved to satisfy the requirements of the statute.
J.R.C.
EQUITY
EQUITY-EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST POLICE INTERFER-
ENCE WITH BUSINESS
Plaintiff, stipulating that he is the owner of a restaurant in the
City of Warren, seeks to enjoin the defendants from stationing po-
lice officers in his place of business. The case was appealed on ques-
tions of law and fact to the Court of Appeals of Trumbull County
from the Court of Common Pleas of that county. During the year
of 1938, there were ten arrests and convictions for exhibiting gam-
bling paraphernalia in the plaintiff's restaurant. Officers were kept
in plaintiff's place of business from about Nov. 28, 1938, until Dec.
8, 1938, continuously from the time that the restaurant opened in the
morning until it closed in the evening. The plaintiff claims that his
property and civil rights have been invaded by the actions of the
defendants and that such an invasion constitutes a continuing tres-
pass for which the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Plain-
1, Seilheimer v. Seilheimer, 40 N. 3. Eq. 412, 2 At. 376 (18S5); but cf. Winner v.
Winner, 171 Wise. 413, 177 N. V. 6S0 (1920).
"I Foss v. Foss, 12 Allen 26 (Mfass. 1866).
2 fHerr v. Herr, 109 Pa. Sup. 42, 165 At. 547 (1916); Bryant v. Bryant, 171 N. C.
746, 88 S. E. 147 (1916); Mason v. 'Mason, 164 Ark. 59, 261 S. W. 40 (1924); Donovan
v. Donovan, 263 N. Y. S. 336, 147 N. Y. Misc. 157 (1933); Santer v. Santer, 324 Pa.
140, 188 AtI. 531 (1936).
= 43 N. J. Eq. 473 at 477, 11 At!. 426 (1887).
